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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20050005-CA

MARTY JOE GALVAN,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from sentences for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, and attempted simple assault, a class A misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. A substitute prosecutor, unaware of the State's plea bargain agreement to
recommend probation with jail time, appeared at sentencing and recommended prison.
When defense counsel explained the problem, the prosecutor withdrew the
recommendation and instead recommended probation. The trial court then imposed

1

Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the code are to the West 2004
publication.
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sentence. Is defendant entitled to resentencing by a new judge where the prosecutor
cured any inadvertent breach of the plea agreement before sentencing?
To prevail on this unpreserved claim, defendant must establish plain error. He
must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,141,
82P.3dll06.
2. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to rule on defendant's 22(e) motion?
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, f 8, 21 P.3d 212.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: "The court may correct
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with robbery, a second degree felony, and attempted theft,
a third degree felony. R2-3. Defendant waived preliminary hearing, and defendant was
bound over as charged. R47.
Defendant pled no contest to theft, a third degree felony, and attempted simple
assault, a class A misdemeanor. R51. The section of the plea statement entitled "plea
agreement" states: "At sentencing, the [S]tate recommends jail time on the Class A with
completion of CATS or a release to an intensive inpatient program. At the end of
successful probation, the [S]tate does not oppose a 76-3-402 reduction." R60. The
notification of charges section has this footnote: "The [Sjtate amends the Information to
2
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charge the two offenses listed above, and defendant pleads as charged to the amended
offenses. State recommends probation." R56. Defendant acknowledged in his plea
statement that any sentencing recommendation was not binding on the trial court. Id.
The trial court accepted the plea. R63. The court also ordered Adult Probation &
Parole (AP&P) to prepare a presentence investigation report (PSI). R51.
At sentencing, Paul Parker appeared for the State, substituting for prosecutor Kelly
Sheffield, who had negotiated the plea agreement. R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing)
at 18. Mr. Parker noted that the PSI detailed defendant's "long and extensive" and
"violen[t]" criminal history and his poor record in probation settings. Id. at 23-24. He
further observed, "[I]t looks to me like [defendant] needs to be in prison, as the presentence report has indicated." Id. at 24. Defendant then made his statement. Id. at 2425.
The trial court then asked if there was any reason the court should not proceed
with sentencing. Id. at 25-26. Defense counsel responded, "[TJhere's no legal reason not
to proceed with sentencing; however, I need to make a couple of observations I want on
the record." Id. at 26. He continued, "If you look at the first page of the change-of-plea
form,. .. Mr. Sheffield's position was that [defendant] should plead to one third and
[one] Class A. In exchange for that, the State would recommend probation with AP&P,
with appropriate jail time." Id. He observed that the position that Mr. Parker had taken
was "contrary to the official plea bargain position from the district attorney's office, and
apparently Mr. Parker did not know that because Mr. Sheffield didn't leave the relevant

3
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note to him." Id. He asked the court to "take judicial notice" of "the official state's
position in this case at the time the plea was negotiated." Id.
At that point, Mr. Parker interrupted. He said, "I think I do need to make that
amendment because it clearly says on the plea form . . . that the State would make a
recommendation of probation. Id. at 27. He continued, "I do not have that in the file, but
we need to stabilize] our agreement to make that recommendation, and I will withdraw
my comments and make an affirmative recommendation of probation." Id.
Defense counsel added, "In addition to that, your Honor, Mr. Sheffield was not
opposed, eventually, to a 402 reduction on the third to a Class A if [defendant] performed
well on probation." Id. at 27. He summarized, "[A]gain Fm asking that the Court follow
basically the joint recommendation of the State and the defense and allow probation to go
forward consistent with where [defendant] fits on AP&P's matrix." Id. at 28.
The court then responded, "Well, Fm not obligated to follow your
recommendation. Ordinarily I have been following recommendations, but in this
instance I see a record of probably twenty or so situations where the defendant is
involved in assault or some kind of abuse in his record." Id. "I just don't feel that,
regardless of what [the] agreement was with Mr. Sheffield," and regardless of the
victim's "pretty dramatic statement" about defendant's violent behavior, "[e]ven setting
those aside and not weighing those in the balance, my inclination would still be to
sentence the defendant at this time to zero to five years in the state prison." Id.
Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to zero to five years in prison on his felony

4
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conviction. Id. The court also sentenced defendant to one year in jail on his class A
misdemeanor conviction and ordered that the sentences run consecutively. Id.
On December 3, 2004, defendant timely appealed from his sentences. Id. at 76.
Current counsel then appeared and moved for an order vacating defendant's sentence
pursuant to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and transferring the case to
another court for resentencing. R82, 84. On March 3, 2005, the trial court entered an
order ruling that the December 3, 2004 notice of appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to hear
defendant's rule 22(e) motion. Rl39-40. Defendant timely appealed that order. R142.
On March 14, 2005, this Court consolidated the two appeals. R144.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
Defendant had been drinking "all day and ni[ght]" in the hours preceding the June
27, 2004 offense. PSI at 4. That Sunday morning, at approximately 3:30 a.m., he took a
cab to a Salt Lake City grocery store. Id. at 3. Shortly thereafter, store employee
Lonnetta Lopshire saw defendant "walk out of the store with a grocery cart containing
four cases of beer." PSI at 3. Realizing that beer could not be sold legally at that hour,
she tried to stop defendant. Id. "[Defendant 'punched' Ms. Lopshire in the face, and
again on the side of the head." Id. After she had fallen to the ground, "he continued to
batter [her] while [she was] on the ground." R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing) at 22.

This statement relies on the factual summary of the offense and on defendant's
statement, both included in the PSI, and on the victim's account of the offense at
sentencing. See PSI at 3-4; R146 (December 6,2004 Sentencing) at 22-23.
5
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The cab driver, having witnessed the incident, got out of his car and took the keys
with him. P SI at 3. He saw defendant drop one case of beer and put the other three into
the cab. Id. Defendant then tried to drive away. Id. When he could not, he left on foot.
Id.
Police apprehended defendant the following day. Id. at 4. He later stated that he
"[w]as intoxicated, went to [the] store in [a] cab[,] walked out with 4 cases of beer[,] got
into [an] altercation[, and] fled the scene." Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court did not plainly err when it sentenced defendant, and defendant is
not entitled to resentencing. Although the substitute prosecutor may initially have
breached the plea agreement, he cured any breach before sentence was imposed.
Moreover, defendant has not shown that the trial court relied on the State's initial
recommendation when it imposed sentence or that he was denied the benefit of his
bargain.
2. The trial court properly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to address defendant's
rule 22(e) motion to vacate. First, defendant had already filed an appeal raising the very
issue he attempted to raise in his rule 22(e) motion. While rule 22(e) permits a defendant
to attack an illegal sentence at any time and in any forum, it does not permit a defendant
to repeatedly challenge his sentence on the same legal basis. Defendant chose to raise his
breach-of-plea challenge to his sentence in the appellate courts. That choice deprived the
district court of jurisdiction to simultaneously address the same issue. Second, because

6
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defendant's sentence was both legal and legally imposed, rule 22(e) did not confer upon
the trial court jurisdiction to address the claims raised in the motion.
ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that he was deprived of "the benefit of his plea bargain" and
asks for "resentencing before a different judge." Br. Appellant at 6. Defendant did not
preserve this claim below and does not argue exceptional circumstances or plain error on
appeal. Defendant, in fact, invited the very error he now claims on appeal. This Court
should therefore decline to review this claim. In any case, defendant has not shown that
the trial court plainly erred when it sentenced him or that he was deprived of the benefit
of his plea bargain. Thus, he is not entitled to resentencing.
After filing a notice of appeal from his sentence, defendant filed a motion to
vacate his sentence in the trial court, arguing that the sentence was illegal or illegally
imposed in violation of rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court
ruled that defendant's filing of the initial notice of appeal deprived the court of
jurisdiction to entertain the motion. That ruling was proper. Defendant had already filed
an appeal raising the very issue he attempted to raise in his rule 22(e) motion, thereby
depriving the district court of jurisdiction to address the same claim. Moreover, because
defendant's sentence was both legal and legally imposed, rule 22(e) did not confer upon
the trial court jurisdiction to address the claims raised in the motion.

7
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I.
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN;
EVEN ASSUMING THE STATE INITIALLY BREACHED THE
PLEA AGREEMENT, THE STATE CURED THE BREACH
A.

Defendant did not preserve this claim.
Defendant claims that he was deprived of the "benefit of his plea bargain" when

the trial judge imposed sentence after the substitute prosecutor had initially recommended
prison. Br. Appellant at 6-7. Defendant did not preserve this claim below.
It is well-settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H 11, 10 P.3d 346. See also State v. Thomas,
1999 UT 2, H 29, 974 P.2d 269 ("Absent any indication that this issue was raised at trial,
it cannot be considered for the first time on appeal"); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,
1022 (Utah 1996) (declining to address claims not raised in the trial court). To preserve
an issue for appeal, a defendant "must enter an objection on the record that is both timely
and specific." State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). "The preservation
requirement is based on the premise that, 'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial
court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate,
correct it.'" State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, If 33,

P.3d

(quoting Holgate, 2000 UT

74, Tj 11, 10 P.3d 346) (additional internal quotations omitted). "Accordingly, an
objection "must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial [court] can
consider it.'" Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 356, 361 (Utah App. 1993)
(additional internal quotations omitted). In other words, "[t]he objection must 'be
specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel [or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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defendant] complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996)).
Here, defendant did not claim below that he had been denied the benefit of his plea
bargain or that he was entitled to sentencing before a different judge. Defense counsel
did not object to Judge Kennedy's imposing sentence after the substitute prosecutor
stated that "it look[ed]... like [defendant] need[ed] to be in prison." R146 (December 6,
2004 Sentencing) at 24. Rather, defense counsel asked the court to take judicial notice
that "the official state's position in this case at the time the plea was negotiated" included
an agreement to recommend probation. Id, at 26. Following defense counsel's request,
the substitute prosecutor acknowledged his error, withdrew his comments, and "ma[de]
an affirmative recommendation of probation." Id. at 27.
Defense counsel was satisfied by the prosecutor's cure. Defense counsel therefore
did not object to sentence being imposed by Judge Kennedy. Defendant never claimed
that the prosecution's initial breach of the plea bargain tainted the proceedings or
required sentencing before a different judge. Defendant thus waived below the claim he
now makes on appeal.
B.

Defendant invited the very error he now claims on appeal.
Where a defendant does not preserve his claim below, he must show "plain error"

to prevail on appeal. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). The plain error
doctrine "exists to permit review of trial court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant
from the harm that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel." State v. Bullock, 791
P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989).
9
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Plain error review, however, does not lie when a party, through counsel,
consciously refrains from objecting or has led the trial court into error. Id.; State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,19, 86 P.3d 742 (holding, in context of challenge to jury
instruction, that "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that
party led the trial court into committing the error"). A defendant invites error "if counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represents] to the court that he or she had no
objection" to the court's act or decision. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, \ 9 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Thus, "'invited error . . . is procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor,
especially where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result.'" State v.
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284-85 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,
560-61 (Utah 1987)). Otherwise, a criminal defendant could 'invite' prejudicial error and
"implant it in the record as a form of appellate insurance . . . . " Id.
Defendant invited the very error he now claims on appeal. Before the trial court
sentenced defendant, the court asked the parties if there was any reason why it should not
proceed with sentencing. R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing) at 26. Defendant stated,
"Your Honor, there's no legal reason not to proceed with sentencing; however, I need to
make a couple of observations I want on the record." Id. Defendant did not ask the court
to continue sentencing. Defendant did not argue that the court, having heard the
prosecutor's initial recommendation, could not or should not impose sentence. Rather,
defendant only wanted the court to be aware of the original bargain before it imposed
sentence. See id. Indeed, after the prosecutor had withdrawn his initial recommendation
10
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and had affirmatively recommended probation, defense counsel asked the court to
proceed on the basis of "the joint recommendation of the State and of the defense." Id. at
28.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court should not allow defendant to preview
the trial court's sentencing decision and then argue that no sentencing should have
occurred. Having affirmatively represented that there was no legal reason not to proceed
with sentencing, defendant should not be permitted to now claim, for the first time on
appeal, that the trial court erred when it imposed sentence.
C.

Defendant has not alleged, much less shown, that the trial court plainly erred
when it sentenced defendant after the State had cured its breach of the plea
agreement.
In any event, defendant has not alleged, much less shown that the trial court

plainly erred when it sentenced defendant after the State had cured its breach of the plea
agreement. Defendant has not shown (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should
have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial. See State v.
Casey, 2003 UT 55, If 41, 82 P.3d 1106.
1.

Where defendant has not argued "exceptional circumstances" or "plain
error" to justify review of his unpreserved claim, this Court should decline to
consider it on appeal.
Where an appellant has waived an issue and "does not argue that 'exceptional

circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue," this Court may decline to
consider it on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)
(citation omitted).

11
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As stated, defendant did not preserve his claim below. Moreover, he does not
argue on appeal that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" justify review of the
claim. This Court should therefore decline to consider the claim on appeal.
2.

Defendant has not shown that the trial court erred.
Defendant bases his claim of error on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257

(1971), where the United States Supreme Court addressed a defendant's entitlement to
the benefit of a plea bargain. In that case, a new prosecutor, replacing the prosecutor who
had negotiated the plea, appeared for sentencing and recommended the maximum
sentence. Id. at 259. When defense counsel objected on the ground that the State had
promised to make no recommendation, the new prosecutor, "apparently ignorant of his
colleague's commitment, argued that there was nothing in the record to support
[Santobello's] claim of a promise." Id. The sentencing judge ended the discussion,
stating that he was "not at all influenced by what the [prosecutor] sa[id]," and then
imposed the maximum sentence. Id.
The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding that "the interests of justice and
appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in
the negotiation of pleas of guilty" required remand. Id. at 262. The court ordered the
state court to determine "whether the circumstances of [the] case require[d] only that
there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case [Santobello]
should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state court, the
circumstances require[d] granting the relief sought by [Santobello], i.e., the opportunity
to withdraw his plea of guilty." Id. at 263.
12
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Santobello involved no effort by the State to cure its breach of the plea bargain
and is therefore distinguishable from this case. When the State cures its breach of a plea
agreement, as it did in this case, the cure alters the significance of the breach.
In State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, 95 P.3d 1203, this Court addressed a cured
breach of a plea agreement. In Smit, the parties entered into a plea agreement, which
included the State's promise "to recommend that any sentence imposed be suspended and
that [Smit] be granted probation." 2004 UT App 222, \ 2. During the change of plea
hearing, the court advised Smit "that it was not bound by the plea agreement and that it
could sentence [him] to prison for up to five years." Id. at ^J 3.
At sentencing, the State recommended jail time, and Smit objected. Id. at ^f 4.
The court called a recess so that the parties could listen to tapes of the change of plea
hearing. Id. When court reconvened, "the State withdrew its affirmative
recommendation for jail." Id. The court observed, "'Apparently, the recommendation
that was part of the agreement was that it was to impose no jail sentence." Id. The State
responded, '"Correct."' Id. The court clarified its understanding of the bargain, stating
that "it imposed the sentence 'under the impression that the State's recommendation was
that [it] should not send [Smit] to jail—or to prison and [it] should not impose, as a
condition of probation any jail sentence.'" Id. The court nevertheless imposed a
suspended prison term, placed Smit on probation for thirty-six months, and sentenced
him to ninety days in jail as part of his probation. Id.
Smit then filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that the State breached the
plea agreement when it recommended jail time. Id. at «f 5. The trial court denied the
13
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motion, concluding that the State had cured the breach by withdrawing its affirmative
recommendation for jail. Id. at 15. At some point in the proceedings, whether at
sentencing or in its ruling on the motion to withdraw, "the trial court stated that it was not
influenced by the State's initial recommendation." Id. at 121.
On appeal, the State in Smit conceded that its initial recommendation breached the
plea agreement, but argued that "by promptly withdrawing its recommendation, it cured
the breach." Id. at f 19. Smit argued "that the cure was ineffective because '[i]t was . . .
insufficient to erase in the court's consciousness the State's real recommendation.'" Id.
This Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to withdraw the plea. The Court reasoned, "[T]he State cured its initial breach of
the plea agreement...." Id. at 121. Observing that the trial court had stated that it was
not influenced by the State's initial recommendation and noting that the only evidence
potentially "supporting Defendant's argument that the trial court was influenced by the
State's initial recommendation [was] the fact that the trial court imposed a sentence
consistent with that [initially] suggested by the State," the Court held that there was "no
evidence to support Defendant's contention that the trial court was influenced by the
initial recommendation." Id.
Smit controls here. In Smit, as in this case, the State recommended jail time, but
withdrew that recommendation following the defendant's objection that it violated the
plea agreement. By contrast, in Santobello, the State recommended jail time and stood
by its recommendation in the face of defense counsel's objection that the
recommendation violated the plea agreement.
14
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Here, as in Smit, while the substitute prosecutor's initial recommendation may
have violated the plea agreement, upon defense counsel's request that the court take
judicial notice of the earlier prosecutor's promise to recommend probation, the substitute
prosecutor concurred in defense counsel's representation of the initial plea agreement,
withdrew his comments, and "ma[de] an affirmative recommendation of probation."
R146 (December 6, 2004 Sentencing) at 27. Moreover, in this case, as in Srnit, the trial
court clarified that its decision did not rest on the State's initial recommendation. The
court explained, "Ordinarily I have been following recommendations, but in this instance
I see a record of probably twenty or so situations where the defendant is involved in
assault, battery, or some kind of abuse in his record." Id. at 28. Based on that record, the
court continued, "I just don't feel that, regardless of what your agreement was with Mr.
Sheffield,... my inclination would still be to sentence the defendant at this time to zero
to five years in the state prison." Id.
Defendant here received the benefit of his bargain. The State affirmatively
recommended probation. R146:27. The trial court chose not to follow the
recommendation, not because it was persuaded by the State's initial recommendation, but
because the PSI presented an extensive record of violent criminal behavior. Thus,
defendant is not entitled to resentencing before a different judge.
3.

Even assuming that error occurred, it could not have been obvious.
Even assuming that error occurred, defendant has not shown that it was obvious.

To show obviousness, defendant must show that the law was clear at the time of trial.
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ 6, 18 P.3d 1123; see also State v. Frausto, 2002 UT
15
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App 259, f 22, 53 P.3d 486, cert denied, 63 P.3d 104; State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239
(Utah App. 1997). As explained above, Smit appears to be controlling law. Smit, decided
six months before defendant's sentencing, holds that where the State cures its initial
inadvertent breach of a plea bargain by withdrawing any recommendation inconsistent
with the plea agreement, the trial court may still impose sentence. See Smit, 2004 UT
App 222, at \ 21. Moreover, a trial court's imposition of "a sentence consistent with that
suggested by the State" does not, by itself, "establish that the trial court was influenced
by the State's recommendation." Id.
Given this precedent, any error in proceeding to sentencing could not have been
obvious.
4.

Defendant has not shown that any error was prejudicial.
As stated, a trial court's imposition of "a sentence consistent with that suggested

by the State" does not, by itself, "establish that the trial court was influenced by the
State's recommendation." Id. Defendant has pointed to nothing more. Thus, defendant
has not shown that any error was prejudicial.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT IT
LACKED JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S POSTAPPEAL RULE 22(E) MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE
The trial court ruled that defendant's appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to hear his
rule 22(e) motion. R139-40. Defendant claims that, despite the filing of his appeal, the
trial court had jurisdiction address the motion. See Br. Appellant at 10.

16
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A.

Defendant chose to raise his breach-of-plea claim on appeal, thereby
depriving the district court of jurisdiction.
The trial court's ruling was proper. As a general rule, a trial court loses

jurisdiction over the merits of a controversy once an appeal is perfected. See Saunders v.
Sharp, 818 P.2d 574,477 (Utah App. 1991); Frost v. District Court, 83 P.2d 737 (Utah
1938). Although the court may retain jurisdiction as to collateral issues, it loses
jurisdiction with respect to the issues that affect the subject matter of the appeal.
Saunders, 818 P.2d at 578; Epic Assoc, v. Wasatch Bank, 725 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah
1986).
A defendant may bring a motion under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
However, although "a criminal defendant may challenge an illegal sentence at any time
and in any forum," he does not have "the right to repeatedly challenge his . . . sentence on
the same legal basis." State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996).
Defendant chose where to attack his sentence. He chose to attack the sentence in
this Court when he filed his January 3, 2005 notice of appeal. His docketing statement,
filed January 21, 2005, lists a single issue: "Did the prosecutor's breach of the plea
agreement render [his] guilty plea involuntary, requiring its withdrawal, and/or
resentencing before a different judge." Docketing Statement at 2. The trial court

The court may, for instance, "retain jurisdiction to reassess costs, correct the
record, enforce a judgment,... or preside over matters which are independent of and do
not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal." Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18,20
(Ind. App. 2000).
17
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therefore determined that it did not have jurisdiction to address the identical issue in the
context of a rule 22(e) motion, where defendant had chosen to raise the issue on appeal.
SteeR139-40.
The trial court's ruling was proper. Defendant's choice to raise the breach-of-plea
issue on appeal deprived this Court of jurisdiction to address the same issue in the context
of a rule 22(e) motion. Cf Clark, 913 P.2d at 362 (holding that a defendant may not
"repeatedly challenge his or her sentence on the same basis" and holding that defendant
could not bring a rule 22(e) motion to challenge a sentence on the basis of a claim earlier
raised and adjudicated on appeal). Had the trial court ruled otherwise, the result may
have been simultaneous adjudication of the issue in the district and appellate courts and
successive appeals on the matter.
B.

Under rule 22(e), a court may correct only an illegal or illegally imposed
sentence. Even assuming the sentence was imposed erroneously, it was not an
illegal or illegally imposed sentence.
In any case, the issue raised by defendant is not a claim properly brought under

rule 22(e). Rule 22(e) provides that a "court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51,
\ 5, 48 P.3d 228 (noting that "because an illegal sentence is void," a rule 22(e) claim
"may be raised at any time") (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
Further, "[w]hile rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any
time, it must be 'narrowly circumscribed' to prevent abuse." State v. Thorkelson, 2004
UT App 9,115, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5, 48 P.3d 228).
"The Utah Supreme Court has held that a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a 'patently' illegal
18
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sentence or a 'manifestly' illegal sentence." Id. (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5; State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995)). "A 'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal sentence
generally occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the sentencing court has no
jurisdiction, or (2) where the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range." Id.
(citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, Tj 5 n.l).
However, where a sentence is neither illegal nor illegally imposed, a trial court has
no jurisdiction to correct it under rule 22(e). Where a defendant claims "ordinary or 'runof-the-mill' error[]," his claims must be "reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure." Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 15.
Here, defendant's sentence was not subject to correction under rule 22(e). It was
not "patently" or "manifestly" illegal. Because the trial court had jurisdiction to impose
the sentence, the sentence was not imposed in an illegal manner. Because the sentence
was within statutory parameters, the sentence was not illegal Thus, rule 22(e) "[could]
not serve as a vehicle" for raising defendant's breach-of-plea claims. See Telford, 2002
UT51,f 6.
Rather, if the trial court erred by imposing sentence after the prosecutor had cured
any breach of the plea bargain, the court's error was ordinary or "run of the mill" error, to
be raised and addressed on appeal. Thus, the trial court, if it had any jurisdiction under
rule 22(e), had jurisdiction only to determine that the alleged error was not "properly
raised under rule 22(e)." Telford, 2002 UT 51,ffif5-6.
Moreover, this Court has jurisdiction only to dismiss defendant's appeal of the
trial court's disposition of his motion to vacate. Where "the initial sentence [is] legal, the
19
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district court los[es] subject matter jurisdiction over the sentence. Likewise, [the
appellate] court has no jurisdiction. Lacking jurisdiction, [the appellate court is] required
to dismiss the appeal." State v. McGuire, 2005 UT App 13, *2 (memorandum decision)
(attached in the Addendum).
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals,
2005 UT 18, If 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,
560 (Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction and dismiss his appeal of the trial
court's disposition of his motion to vacate.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Shawn C. McGuire appeals the sentence entered
by the trial court. McGuire also appeals an order
denying a motion to reconsider the sentence.
McGuire pleaded guilty to operation of a clandestine
laboratory, a first degree felony under the
circumstances of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § §
58-37d-4(1)(a), -5 (2004 Supp.). On August 12,
2002, the trial court sentenced McGuire to an
indeterminate term of "not less than five years and
which may be life in the Utah State Prison." Rather
than file an appeal, on August 13, 2002, McGuire
filed a "motion to reconsider sentence." The motion
was denied on April 1, 2003, on the basis that there
were no grounds upon which to "reconsider" the
sentence, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
reconsider a legally imposed sentence. McGuire
subsequently filed this appeal.
An appeal must be filed within thirty days from the
entry of a final judgment or order. See Utah R.App.
P. 4. In a criminal case, it is "the sentence itself
which constitutes a final judgment from which the
appellant has the right to appeal." State v. Bower.

Se

1

2002 UT 100. ] 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The "30- day
period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case
... is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this
[cjourt." State v. Johnson. 635 P.2d 36. 37 (Utah
1981).
McGuire's notice of appeal was filed eight months
after entry of the sentence by the trial court, long past
the jurisdictional deadline. See Utah R.App. P. 4.
However, McGuire argues that the time for filing an
appeal was tolled in this case because McGuire filed
a "motion to reconsider sentence" the day after the
sentence was issued. JTN1J
FN1. McGuire argues that the "motion to
reconsider" the sentence was actually a
motion to "alter or amend the judgment"
under rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, thereby tolling the time for
appeal under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See Utah R.App. P.
4(b). McGuire's attempt to categorize his
"motion to reconsider" the sentence as a
motion under rule 59 is unavailing because
rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically applies to sentences.
See Utah R. Crim P. 22: Utah R. Civ. P.
81(e) ("These rules of procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings
where there is no other applicable statute or
rule...."). The fact that a remedy under rule
22(e) is extremely limited does not alter this
outcome.
Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State v,
Montova, 825 P.2d 676. 679 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
However, rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides a mechanism by which a
defendant may attack "an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."
Utah
R.Crim. P. 22(e). McGuire
sought
reconsideration of the sentence which was imposed
after his guilty plea was entered in this case. Giving
McGuire the benefit of the doubt, his motion to
reconsider his sentence may be construed as a motion
pursuant to rule 22(e). See Montova, 825 P.2d at 679.
The district court's jurisdiction over the resentencing
turns on whether the initial sentence was legal. Id
(citing State v. Babbell 813 P.2d 86. 88 (Utah
1991)). Under Montoya, this court must "determine
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whether the initial sentence was valid. If it was valid,
the trial court would have had no further subject
matter jurisdiction to resentence [defendant].
Likewise, this court would have no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal." Id.
An illegal sentence under rule 22(e) must be
"patently" or "manifestly" illegal. State v.
Thorkelson. 2004 UT App 9,f 15, 84 P.3d 854. "A
'patently1 or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally
occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the
sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where
the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory
range." Id. McGuire's challenge to his sentence does
not fall under either situation. Instead, McGuire
challenges the decision of the trial court to deny
probation and sentence him to prison, a decision that
is "within the complete discretion of the trial court."
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048. 1049 (Utah
Ct.App.1991). As in Thorkelson, the error alleged by
McGuire involves an "ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill'
error regularly reviewed on appeal under rule
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure."
Thorkelsoiu 2004 UT App 9 at 11 15. [FN21 There is
no showing that there was anything illegal about
McGuire's sentence.
FN2. Moreover, there is no showing that the
trial court abused its discretion, let alone
entered an "illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner[.]" Utah
R.Crim. P. 22(e).
*2 Jurisdiction to resentence McGuire would require
an illegality in the initial sentence. Because the initial
sentence was legal, the district court lost subject
matter jurisdiction over the sentence. See Montova,
825 P.2d at 680. Likewise, this court has no
jurisdiction. See id. Lacking jurisdiction, we are
required to dismiss the appeal. See Loffredo v. Holt,
2001 UT97,f lL37P.3d 1070.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 13
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